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Abstract 
 
The history of tax havens during the decades before World War II is still little 
known. To date, the studies that have focused on the 1920s and 1930s have 
presented either a very general perspective on the development of tax havens or 
a narrow national point of view. Based on unpublished historical archives of five 
countries (Switzerland, Great Britain, Belgium, France, Germany), this paper 
offers therefore a new comparative appraisal of international tax competition 
during this period in order to answer the following question: What was the 
specificity of the Swiss case  – already considered a quintessential tax haven at 
the time – in comparison to other banking centres? 
The findings of this research study are twofold. First, the 1920s and 1930s 
appear as something of a golden age of opportunity for avoiding taxation 
through the relocation of assets. Most of the financial centres granted consistent 
tax benefits for imported capital, while the limited degree of international 
cooperation and the usual guarantee of banking secrecy in European countries 
prevented the taxation of exported assets. Second, within this general 
environment, the fiscal strategies of a tax haven like Switzerland differed from 
those of a great financial power like Great Britain. Whereas the Swiss 
administration readily placed itself at the service of the banking community, 
British policy was more balanced between the contradictory interests of the 
Board of Inland Revenue, the Treasury, and the English business circles. 
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1. Introduction
1
 
 
With the advent of the financial crisis in 2007, Swiss bank secrecy has once again found itself 
at the forefront of the international stage. At a time when States have had to unfreeze huge 
sums to help bail out their banking systems, and budgetary revenues have been 
simultaneously curtailed due to the recession, the damage caused by international tax 
competition has become a burning issue in political terms. The world’s foremost cross-border 
wealth manager, the Swiss financial centre has thus become the prime target for calls for a 
regulation of offshore practices, which has forced the Swiss government to accede to limited 
cooperation against tax evasion in 2009. In such a context, it is worth focusing on the role of 
taxation in the takeoff of the Swiss financial centre which occurred during the interwar years 
(1918-1939). Although the crisis has highlighted the sheer extent of the phenomenon of 
international tax evasion, it tends to encourage a short-term analysis of tax havens, which are 
reduced to being symptoms of the dysfunctions of the present economy. This viewpoint 
conceals the structural importance of taxation in international financial competition during the 
twentieth century. Furthermore, the 1920s and 1930s provide instructive comparisons with the 
current situation. A time of acute economic disorder, they were characterized, as today’s 
situation is, by a considerable increase in national debt and by the acute politicization of 
issues to do with State financing. Analysing tax competition during this period is therefore all 
the more relevant.  
The role of taxation in the transformation of Swiss banks into a refuge for capital 
flight after World War I has already been identified by several historical studies. The costs of 
war and reconstruction brought about considerable tax increases in the former warring 
countries, which in turn increased the incentive to relocate assets in order to escape tax 
controls. In contrast, the attractiveness of the Swiss financial centre was reinforced by the 
maintenance in Switzerland of a low tax burden and the guaranteed rigorous respect of bank 
secrecy by the administration.
2
 In external relations, these tax benefits were also vigorously 
defended in the face of the incipient international pressure occurring from the beginning of 
the 1920s.
3
 From these different studies, the overall idea emerges, then, that an active policy 
of fiscal attractiveness was pursued in Switzerland and that this played a crucial role in the 
internationalization of the Swiss financial centre that began during the interwar years. 
Although it is based on extensive archival documentation, this interpretation still suffers from 
a certain bias, however—it lacks a comparative point of view. To assess the impact of 
taxation in the surge of capital towards the Swiss financial centre and to measure the 
specificity of the country’s international tax policy, it is necessary to compare systematically 
the Swiss case with other banking centres. This is what this paper aims to do in three stages. 
To begin with (Part 2), the article shows the causal link between the maintenance of a 
weak and liberal State in Switzerland and the novel attraction Swiss banks had for foreign 
assets following World War I. Contrary to the belligerent countries, the limitation of the 
State’s financial weight facilitated the setting up of systems to attract capital through taxation, 
the special features of which are discussed in the rest of the text. The second section (Part 3) 
                                                 
1
 This paper is related to a PhD thesis on double taxation and tax evasion during the interwar period. I 
would like to thank Marc Flandreau, Sébastien Guex, Marion Rosselet, Pierre Sicsic and Gianni 
Toniolo for their helpful comments, as well as the participants of the CEPR Past, Present and Policy 4 
meeting in Geneva and of the European Historical Economics Society Conference in Dublin. 
2
 See for example Guex (2000; 2002); Hug (2002); Perrenoud et al. (2002, pp. 83-100); Guex, Lopez 
and Mazbouri (2012). For an opposite view on the importance of taxation and bank secrecy for the 
attractiveness of the Swiss haven, see Vogler (2001; 2005). 
3
 See Perrenoud (1999, pp. 388-397; 2003; 2011, pp. 203-226); Perrenoud and Lopez (2002, pp. 67-
74); Schaufelbuehl (2009, pp. 316-330); Farquet (2009a; 2009b; 2012; 2013). 
 3 
compares systematically the modalities of taxation for non-residents in Switzerland with the 
practices of the main financial centres. Finally, in the third section (Part 4), Swiss policy in 
relation to international tax evasion is evaluated in comparison with the strategies of a great 
banking power. Thus, the focus is limited in order to concentrate on the Swiss decision-
making process, by comparison with Great Britain, in the face of multilateral and bilateral 
attempts at establishing a system of cooperation against tax evasion between the national 
administrations.  
Two findings emerge from the analysis. On the one hand, the perspective that is 
proposed here regarding the extent of tax competition and tax avoidance supports generally 
the recent work of political science, which considers tax havens as a structural phenomenon 
of the modern economy.
4
 At the same time, my paper radicalises the specific conclusions 
about the interwar period, which is described in these studies as a preparatory phase to the 
offshore financial boom occurring from the 1960s onward. At the level of taxation practices 
for non-residents as well as the struggle against tax evasion, I show that the 1920s and 1930s 
appear rather as something of a golden age of opportunity for avoiding taxation through the 
relocation of assets. Most of the financial centres granted considerable tax relief for imported 
assets, while the very limited degree of international cooperation and the ineffectiveness of 
exchange controls prevented the taxation of exported capital. On the other hand, within this 
general environment, the specificity of the Swiss tax policy is confirmed. Owing to its lenient 
fiscal legislation for non-residents, the possibility of tax evasion was greater than in most 
other countries. Moreover, in international taxation negotiations, in comparison with Great 
Britain, the formulating of Swiss strategies was different, due to a remarkable subordination 
of the state apparatus to the interests of the banking community. The weakness of the tax 
administration therefore permitted the Swiss financial centre to be at the forefront of fiscal 
attractiveness in the interwar period. 
The first part of the article is based on data from historical statistical compilations. In 
order to obtain more complete figures regarding tax burdens, these were complemented by 
national yearbooks. In the second part, so as to compare different forms of taxation, legal 
texts of the time have been coupled with various studies carried out by tax authorities and the 
League of Nations (LON). These documents offer the advantage of analysing the actual 
taxation measures that may differ from fiscal legislation. The data in these two sections 
provide, then, a new vision of tax competition during the interwar years, which in itself 
constitutes a contribution to the historiography of taxation. While it is customary in histories 
of taxation to underline the extent of resistance that occurred on the part of the high-income 
circles in opposition to the institution of modern systems of taxation after World War I, the 
international aspect of these reactions is still little-known.
5
 The same holds true for the 
literature on the flows of capital during this period, which makes little allowance for the 
weight of taxation—in opposition to political instability, budget deficits, or monetary 
disorders—as an incentive to the flight of assets.6 Lastly, the third part is mainly based on 
primary archival sources. As the analysis is concerned with state policy vis-à-vis international 
tax evasion, it is the British and Swiss public records, namely the Public Record Office and 
the Swiss Federal Archives, which have been consulted as a priority. By providing access to 
confidential debates within different administrations, these sources enable us to follow closely 
the decision-making mechanisms at work in discussions of international taxation.   
                                                 
4
 See Picciotto (1999); Palan (2002); Palan, Murphy and Chavagneux (2010). 
5
 For national perspectives on this resistance, see for example, for Germany, Witt (1987, pp. 137-160); 
for France, Hautcoeur and Sicsic (1999, pp. 38-41); for the United States, Thorndike (2009, pp. 33-
38). 
6
 On capital flows during the interwar period, see for example Brown (1987, pp. 1-172); James (1992; 
2002); Feinstein and Watson (1995); Eichengreen (2003, pp. 29-37). 
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2. The takeoff of the Swiss financial centre and the maintenance of a weak 
State in Switzerland during the interwar years  
 
The takeoff and the internationalization of the Swiss financial centre following the Great War 
constitute an undeniable phenomenon in banking history.
7
 In a subordinate position before the 
war, notably with regard to the competition of France and Germany, Swiss bankers took 
advantage of the new international context to affirm themselves as figures of substance in the 
financial world at the beginning of the 1920s. Although, for example, the cumulative balance 
sheets of the major Swiss banks represented only 26% of those of their French counterparts in 
1913, they subsequently amounted to 73% in 1929.
8
 The Swiss financial centre was 
particularly renowned in the sector of cross-border wealth management. In fact, foreign 
capital flowed en masse towards the Swiss haven in the interwar years. According to a LON 
report, owing to the importance of foreign assets, in 1929, Switzerland possessed by far the 
highest per capita total of bank deposits in the world.
9
 The lack of a reliable balance of 
payments, as much as the absence of the legal obligation for Swiss banks to publish details 
regarding their accounts, nevertheless prevent an exact estimate of the total amount of 
imported capital. Banking balance sheets indicate a general trend, but are inadequate sources. 
A committee of experts working on Swiss history during World War II who, exceptionally, 
had access to the in-house archives of the banks, showed that holdings of securities, generally 
in off-balance-sheet bank custody accounts, represented, in the two biggest Swiss banks in 
1931, more than three times their balance-sheet. Hence, the figure of 1,359.6M Swiss francs 
(CHF) for 1937 that was given during the first survey undertaken by the Swiss National Bank 
(SNB) on the assets of foreign clients was amply underestimated.
10
 
 In order to try and evaluate the magnitude of foreign capital invested in Swiss banks, 
historians have used figures gleaned in archival sources. This method showed that  the sums 
proposed are very high. Whereas the total amounts cited in contemporary studies before the 
Great War were around 2 billion CHF, the sums rose to 10-20 billion in 1920.
11
 Perrenoud 
also estimates them at 10 billion on the eve of World War II.
12
 It was mainly French and 
                                                 
7
 See for example Guex (1993, pp. 9-12); Perrenoud et al. (2002, pp. 44-71); Fior (2002); Mazbouri 
and Perrenoud (2008); Guex, Lopez and Mazbouri (2012). 
8
 See ‘Place financière’. In Dictionnaire historique de la Suisse, 2011 (hls-dhs-dss.ch). 
9
 See League of Nations (1931, pp. 8-9). The deposits in commercial banks and other credit 
institutions per capita were estimated at 714 $ in Switerland, 438 $ in the United States and 292 $ in 
the UK.  
10
 On this SNB figure and the problems of evaluating the amounts of foreign capital, see Perrenoud et 
al. (2002, pp. 85-90). The international estimations such as Feinstein and Watson (1995) are not useful 
because they show the net flow of capital and not the amounts of capital imports and exports. 
Furthermore, they do not give accurate estimates of the illegal capital flight. See also Guex, Lopez and 
Mazbouri (2012): according to these authors, from the mid-1920s to World War II, the assets under 
management in the Swiss banks were usually bigger than the total of their balance-sheets. 
11
 For the figure before 1913, see Guex (1993, p. 150). For similar estimations, see also Sancey (2004, 
pp. 51-52).  For the figure in 1920, see Guex (2013). In order to gauge the importance of the figure of 
10-20 billion CHF for Switzerland, we might note that it represented between around 20% and 40% of 
Switzerland’s national wealth (See Fahrländer 1921). For exchange rates, see Appendix 2 (10 billion 
CHF = $2.3 billion). 
12
 Perrenoud (2011, p. 127). 
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German capital that was invested in Switzerland.
13
 In the second half of the 1930s, French 
capital alone would attain between 4 and 8 billion CHF—and even 10 billion according to a 
maximum total amount cited by the Swiss government in 1937—that would constitute 
between 15% and 50% of all expatriate French assets.
14
 For its part, according to several 
archival sources, German capital would be situated at between 3 and 5 billion CHF at the 
beginning of the 1930s. In comparison with statistics of the Reich administration, this would 
mean that between a quarter and half of German assets in flight would have therefore taken 
refuge in Switzerland.
15
 As for capital from Italy, Austria, or even from Spain, it is certain 
that a significant amount was also involved.
16
 Lastly, it is necessary to add that Swiss bankers 
did not content themselves with importing foreign assets. A large part of that capital was re-
exported on foreign markets. This ‘turntable business’ (Siegenthaler 1976, p. 566) of 
European capital was conveyed by the fact that the sum of foreign investments was roughly 
equivalent to the imported assets, namely between 7.5 and 21.6 billion CHF at the end of the 
1930s.
17
 
The new international attractiveness of the Swiss financial centre derived directly from 
Switzerland’s lack of participation in World War I and its consecutive political stability. 
During the conflict, the neutral islet had already attracted capital to it from the neighbouring 
countries.
18
 In the interwar years, unlike the acute socio-political disturbances and the 
strengthening of the Left elsewhere in Europe, the hegemony of the Swiss Right during the 
whole period continued to reassure the high-income circles. Though a direct motive for 
capital investment—to which must be added the geographical proximity of Switzerland in 
relation to the major European States—the country’s neutrality and conservatism guaranteed 
above all the pursuit of a liberal economic policy favourable to its financial centre.
19
 In 
contrast to new regulations implanted in other countries, foreigners found in Switzerland the 
investment conditions that prevailed before the war in Europe, such as an absence of 
exchange control, an orthodox monetary policy, and a lack of state interventionism. These 
advantages more than compensated for the low level of interest rates in Switzerland.
20
 As an 
                                                 
13
 For example, see Archives fédérales suisses (AF), E 2001 D, 1000/1555, vol. 18, Confidential report 
of the Association des banquiers privés de Suisse, 21 April 1937.  
14
 For estimates of French capital, see Perrenoud and Lopez (2002, pp. 18-35). The figure of 10 billion 
comes from the following source: AF, E 2001 D, 1000/1555, vol. 15, Minutes of the Federal Council 
(=government), 25 June 1937. Indeed, for 1937, contemporary estimates give the figure of 80-130 
billion in 1928 French francs for exported capital, namely 16-26 billion CHF (See Rist and Schwob 
1939, p. 543). 
15
 See Guex (1999, p. 284); Loepfe (2006, p. 55). Guex gives two amounts: 4 billion CHF for 
accumulated German capital flight to Switzerland during the years 1927-1930 and 3.25 billion CHF 
just for 1929-1930. Loepfe cites two sources about the total German capital exported in Switzerland in 
1930: one gives 3.5-5 billion CHF and the other 4.35 billion CHF. The Reich Statistical Office 
estimated the German capital flight during 1924-1930 at 8.5-9.5 billion marks, namely 10.5-11.5 
billion CHF. Another figure of 8.8 billion marks was given by the same office for the years 1927-1930 
(See James 1986, p. 298). 
16
 For Italian capital, see Hauser (2001, pp. 26-29); Gerardi (2007, pp. 465-478). The importance of 
Austrian capital after World War I was noted, for example, by the Swiss Legation (See AF, E 2001 B, 
1000/1509, vol. 6, Letter from Charles Bourcart, minister at the Swiss Legation in Vienna, to Felix 
Calonder, federal councillor (=minister) in charge of the Federal Political Department (=Foreign 
Affairs), 25 October 1919). 
17
 See Perrenoud (2011, p. 107). 
18
 See for example Ruggia (1993, p. 82). 
19
 On the culture of stability in Switzerland as an asset for the Swiss financial centre, see for example 
Tanner (2000); Straumann (2006, pp. 165-167). 
20
 See Siegenthaler (1976, pp. 566-568). 
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indication of this new international status of the Swiss financial centre, the CHF, which had 
been a relatively soft currency before the war, became a safe investment quoted on all the 
important foreign markets. The conservatism of Swiss economic policy at the end of the 
fighting led to a lasting confidence in the CHF, the solidity of which was turned, in the sequel 
to the interwar years, into a veritable fetish by the SNB and the leaders of the Swiss 
Confederation.
21
 Graph 1 illustrates the strength Swiss currency enjoyed by showing the 
evolution of the value of an investment made in 1913 in another currency as compared to the 
CHF. Setting aside the short post-war period in which the dollar prevailed over the CHF, in 
1939, only the Dutch guilder was situated at a rate higher than that of the Swiss currency. The 
CHF thus became a very profitable investment for the French and Germans: the value of the 
French franc was divided by nine in the interwar years, while the mark disappeared in the 
hyperinflation of 1922-1923. 
 
1: The strength of the CHF 
 
Evolution in % of the value of an investment made in 1913 in foreign currency in relation to 
the CHF. 
Source: calculated on the basis of data provided in Appendix 2. 
 
If we now take a closer look at the strict financial factors of this takeoff, Swiss banks 
benefited from a competitive advantage because, in contrast to the explosion of government 
expenditure in Europe to cover the costs of the war and the ensuing reconstruction, state 
economic intervention was contained in Switzerland in the post-war years. Whereas the 
expenditure of all the central and local state institutions related to the GDP in 1913 attained 
almost the same level there (10.66%) as in the UK (13.04%) or in France (12.29% in 1912), 
in 1920, that expenditure had become much lower (14.77%, as against 25.91% in France and 
28.37% in the UK).
22
 Accordingly, faced with the post-war period dilemma of financing 
through taxation or via monetary inflation to cover the public sector expansion, Switzerland 
managed, at least in part, to avoid soaring prices without the considerable tax increase that 
                                                 
21
 See Guex (2003). 
22
 For the expenditures, see Flora et al. (1983, pp. 345-449). General expenditure is involved, 
including national insurance. For the sources on the GDP, see Appendix 1. 
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occurred abroad.
23
 As Table 2 shows, the Swiss experience differed, on the one hand, from 
the inflationist countries—Germany, France and Belgium—that raised taxes too late to check 
the increase in prices. On the other hand, it differed from British policy, which soon covered 
expenditure through a remarkable fiscal effort. In the second part of the 1920s, and following 
the stabilization of the monetary systems, Switzerland had by far the lowest tax burden in 
European countries in relation to the GDP. Moreover, with the exception of the Netherlands, 
inflation was less strong in the Confederation than elsewhere. 
 
2: Inflation or taxation? 
 
1. Evolution of the consumer price index in relation to its level in 1913 (1913=100) 
Sources: Mitchell (2007a, pp. 748-750, Table H2; 2007b, pp. 962-964, Table H2). For 
Belgium: index of 1914 instead of 1913. 
2. Evolution of the general tax burden (tax revenues of the central government and local 
bodies) divided by the GDP, in comparison to its level in Switzerland (=100). 
Sources: calculated on the basis of Appendix 4. 
*= data unavailable. 
 
  
Consequently, as far as taxation is concerned, the attractiveness of the Swiss financial 
centre was established by the modest use of direct taxes. The upper section of Table 3 
demonstrates the increase in direct fiscal pressure, measured in relation to the GDP, which 
resulted from the remodelling of the system of taxation on incomes and wealth that was 
undertaken in all countries in order to finance the increase in government spending in the 
interwar period. Although in very different ways, all States used the taxation of incomes and 
wealth to a greater degree than before the conflict. The high incomes, the main holders of 
movable assets, were especially targeted by the new deductions: in France, the theoretical 
maximum levels of the general income tax increased, for example, from 2% in 1915 to 90% 
in 1924, and those in Great Britain rose between 1914 and 1921 from 17.2% to 60%.
24
 In such 
a context, investors thus strove increasingly to keep their assets hidden from the prying eyes 
of the tax authorities, notably through the expatriation of their patrimony. The opportunities 
for capturing this foreign capital resulting from tax evasion were all the more numerous for 
Swiss bankers, taking into account that the Swiss direct tax burden remained moderate by 
international standards; tax pressure on incomes and wealth was on an average over the period 
                                                 
23
 On the choice between inflation and taxation after World War I, see for example Kindleberger 
(1993, pp. 283-352). 
24
 For the French rate of general income tax, see Piketty (2001, p. 265). For the English rate (the 
cumulation of income tax and super-tax), see Report of the Commissioners (1915, pp. 97 and 132; 
1922, pp. 111 and 140). 
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some 20% to 60% lower in Switzerland than in the two great Anglo-Saxon financial powers. 
Only Belgium, a country in which resistance to taxation was particularly strong during the 
interwar years, presented a tax burden lower than Switzerland’s over the period as a whole.25  
 
3: The structure of the direct tax burden  
1. Direct tax revenues from state institutions as a whole (central government and local 
bodies) in relation to the GDP. 
2. Direct tax revenues of central government related to direct tax revenues of state institutions 
as a whole.  
This involves data of one year included in the period indicated. Belgium: 1912, 1925, 1938; 
France: 1910, 1925, 1930, 1935; Germany: 1913, 1925, 1930, 1936; Netherlands: 1912, 
1927, 1930, 1935; Switzerland: 1913, 1925, 1930, 1938; UK: 1910, 1925, 1930, 1935; USA: 
1913, 1927, 1932, 1938.  
Sources: for European tax revenues, see Flora et al. (1983, pp. 257-343); for the USA, see 
Carter et al. (2006, vol. 5, Table Ea 132-159, Ea 348-384, Ea 489-518).
26
 For sources about 
the GDP, see Appendix 1. 
 
 
Finally, as regards taxes on (the income from) capital in particular, a phenomenon 
specific to Switzerland tended to accentuate their weakness even more: the decentralization of 
the fiscal system, illustrated by the lower section of Table 3. Unlike another federal country 
like the United States, the responsibility for applying all tax laws—central and local—was left 
up to the cantonal and communal authorities. Given that until the late 1930s nearly no 
harmonization of taxation practices was initiated and that no automatic service for the 
                                                 
25
 Belgium even went so far as to remove temporarily the progressive income tax during the Great 
Depression between 1930 and 1935 (See Putman 1950, pp. 390-406; Hardewyn 2005, p. 289). On the 
resistance to the progressive taxation after WWI in Belgium, see Hardewyn (2003, pp. 97-99). 
However, note that the general direct taxes in Belgium and in France are here a little underevaluated 
because the inheritance taxes are illogically considered as indirect taxes in Flora et al. (1983, pp. 286 
and 289). 
26
 For the USA, direct taxes are: property taxes + income taxes + a part of the ‘other taxes’ such as 
given in Carter et al. (2006, vol. 5). On the basis of U.S. Department of Commerce (1975, pp. 1106-
1107, 1130 and 1133), this part has been approximately determined as the total of ‘other taxes’ for the 
central government + half of ‘other taxes’ for state governments + half of ‘other taxes’ for local 
governments. On the contrary, for the centralisation of direct taxes in the USA, the proportion is the 
result of: (central property taxes + central income taxes) / (total property taxes + total income taxes).  
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exchange of fiscal information existed among the cantons,
27
 Switzerland was, from the point 
of view of direct taxation, a composite constellation of minuscule States that simply paid 
tribute to the central government. At the end of the 1930s, the Administration fédérale des 
contributions (AFC, the Swiss Federal Tax Administration) employed barely a hundred-odd 
officials, while, for example, in 1938-1939 in the United Kingdom, the Inland Revenue had 
24,000 employees.
28
 As a result, supported by Swiss conservatives and employers, this 
decentralization of the system of deductions pushed down the level of taxes on movable assets 
in Switzerland at least for three reasons.
29
 First, the cantons and communes found themselves 
in competition with one another to attract capital to their region. Second, the apparatus for 
collecting taxes, in the hands of small local structures, remained underdeveloped. Third, 
business circles that were very well structured in Switzerland could more easily assert their 
claims against a rickety and fragmentary administration.  
This anaemia of the fiscal State – resulting from the political environment and the 
federalist structure – enabled Swiss authorities to deploy an intensive strategy of attracting 
capital through taxation during the interwar years. This strategy was expressed, on the one 
hand, by the creation of legal provisions that were highly favourable to imported assets; these 
provisions are analysed below. On the other hand, a vigorous defence of Swiss tax benefits in 
international negotiations was undertaken, which is dealt with in Part 4. In that sense, the 
flight of assets towards Switzerland was favoured not only by a push factor—the tax increases 
in other countries—but also by a pull factor—Swiss fiscal policy.  
 
 
3. A tax-free zone in the centre of Europe  
 
An opening remark: Switzerland’s international fiscal attractiveness in the interwar years is 
not reflected in the theoretical tax rates on income and the capital of movable wealth, 
presented in Graphs 4.
30
 Unlike what happened in the second half of the twentieth century,
31
 a 
dumping policy in the tax rates of private individuals was not perceptible in Switzerland in 
the 1920s and 1930s. For an average fortune of 100,000 CHF,
32
 Swiss rates were close to 
French ones at the start of the 1920s, and then certainly became lower. However, owing to the 
high English income tax allowance (in 1920, £225 for a married man, namely 4,800 CHF), 
the incomes on such a capital sum were, for their part, usually exempt from tax in Great 
Britain during the period. This observation was confirmed for the very high incomes: 
theoretical Swiss rates were generally higher than British ones. As for France, it was only on 
                                                 
27
 On the absence of the exchange of information, see AF, E 2001 D, 1000/1555, vol. 1, Agreement in 
order to develop cantonal fiscal law. Minutes of the Commission of the Conference of Cantonal 
Finance Directors, 7 September 1937.  
28
 On the structural weakness of the AFC, see Ceni (2008). During the Great Depression, the AFC had 
87 employees on average (See Müller 2010, pp. 465). For the number of British officials, see Griffith 
(1949, p. 43). 
29
 See Guex (1993, pp. 145-154; 1998, pp. 101-128). 
30
 This result contradicts the hypothesis about Switzerland made in Dell, Piketty and Saez (2007, p. 
474). From a more general point of view, the lack of link that is demonstrated here between top 
theoretical tax rates and real taxation questions the relevance for the interwar of Piketty's studies on 
the role of taxation on high incomes in reducing inequality.  
31
 For Swiss rates in comparison to international rates after the war, see Longchamp (2010, pp. 13-14). 
32
 If one refers to the consumer price index, it is necessary to multiply the total amounts cited here by 
six in order to get an idea of their approximate value today (See Office fédéral de la statistique, 
‘Tableaux statistiques historiques’ Table 5.1.1: 
http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/fr/index/dienstleistungen/history/01.html). 
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top high incomes that the legal taxation was significantly heavier than that applied in 
Switzerland.  
 Nevertheless, such data do not indicate a weakening of Swiss effective fiscal 
competitiveness, given that the rates took account of neither the principles for determining the 
tax base nor the methods for collecting taxes. The level of pre-war rates – higher in 
Switzerland than in the other two countries – already provides an indication of the lack of 
credence one must give to these figures. At that time, these values had strictly no relevance 
due to the liberal taxation practices of the pre-war years. In 1914, Edwin R. Seligman noted, 
for example, that in certain Swiss cantons, it was the custom to simply ask the taxpayers how 
much they wanted to pay.
33
 Owing to the persistence of fiscal federalism, this gulf between 
theoretical rates and their real collection continued to a large extent during the interwar years: 
in deliberately underestimating his calculations, one of the finest specialists in Swiss financial 
policy arrived at an estimate of around 60% of the Swiss private wealth on which federal 
direct tax was not levied between 1929 and 1932.
34
 
 
4: Theoretical rates of taxation on (the income from) capital 
 
0.1M CHF:  
 
 
1M CHF:  
 
                                                 
33
 Seligman (1914, p. 359). 
34
 Moreover, according to this study, 48% of the taxable wealth was illegally evaded to the federal tax 
during the same period (See Grossmann 1939, p. 136). 
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5M CHF:  
 
Income and wealth taxes for a capital of 0.1M, 1M and 5M CHF. 
Sources: see Appendix 3. 
 
 
From the point of view of real taxation practices, the fiscal attractiveness of 
Switzerland resulted, therefore, from a system of taxation based for the most part on the 
declaration of the taxpayer in the interwar period.
35
 In order to increase the tax yield, most of 
the other European States—including Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Italy— instituted, 
in effect, two-tier systems of taxation. Those combined proportional taxes collected at source 
and a complementary progressive taxation for high incomes on declaration, which taxed the 
same tax base a second time.
36
 Now, owing to the high tax deductions and allowances, the 
weakness of the tax controls and the extent of fiscal evasion on the part of the holders of 
assets in the post-World War I years, it was taxation at source that provided the bulk of the 
tax revenues on movable capital in Europe. In both the 1920s and 1930s in France, the total 
amount of movable assets taxed at source was more than twice that same category of income 
declared to the general taxation system.
37
 In Great Britain, Richard Hopkins, then at the Board 
of Inland Revenue (BIR), estimated in 1919 that the abandonment of the system of collecting 
income tax at source would be ‘nothing less than disastrous’ and would lead to an annual loss 
                                                 
35
 See Archives of the LON (ALON), F. 34, Memorandum by Hans Blau, director of the AFC, 14 May 
1923. On the absence of taxation at source in Switzerland, see Blumenstein (1926, pp. 44-51).  
36
 For an overview of the direct tax systems after WWI, see, for example, Ardant (1972, pp. 493-515). 
37
 In 1921, 3,536M French francs of incomes from movable capital were declared for general taxation, 
while 8,200M were subject to scheduled taxation. In 1937, the proportion had not changed: 7,833M 
against 17,500M. For revenues declared for general taxation, see Ministère des finances (1923, pp. 
476-477; 1938, p. 37bis). For contemporary estimates of incomes subject to scheduled taxation, see 
Piketty (2001, p. 715). According to contemporary estimates, at least 50% of movable assets evaded 
illegally the French general tax in the 1920s and the 1930s (See Hautcoeur and Sicsic 1999, p. 40). 
The estimates of the French tax administration varied from around 40% to 70% (See Farquet 2012, p. 
99). In Belgium, the situation was even worse. According to a study of the Belgian tax administration, 
14,920M Belgian francs of incomes of bonds and shares were taxed at source in 1919-1924, whereas 
only 3,810M were declared to the general income tax. The same study estimated that 66% of those 
incomes would have escaped this latter tax because of fraudulent acts (See Archives générales du 
Royaume, T 122, 601, Report of Charles Clavier, director of the Belgian direct tax administration, 
1925). 
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to the British State of £50M.
38
 Accordingly, the efficiency of the English fiscal system, 
demonstrated by the results in Table 3, derived not only from the consent of the British people 
to taxation, but also from the fact that a portion of the income, greater than in France and in 
Switzerland, was taxed without the cooperation of the taxpayer.
39
 The average of annual rates 
of income tax, collected at source on movable assets, was actually around 24% in the interwar 
years, while in France that of scheduled tax on this kind of incomes rose to 16%.
40
 As for 
Switzerland, a single tax was levied at source, the tax on coupons of shares and bonds, the 
rates of which fluctuated between 2% and 6% over the period.
41
 The image that seems to 
emerge from the confrontation between practices and theoretical rates of capital taxation is 
thus the following: France had a strong progressive legal taxation, with ample possibilities for 
bypassing taxation for a wide fringe of incomes; Great Britain offered a less progressive 
theoretical taxation, but it was harder for a greater portion of wealth to escape taxation; 
Switzerland had a moderately progressive system, while allowing effective collection to 
depend on the goodwill of taxpayers for almost the whole of their capital.
42
 
 Made possible by the less urgent need to find new fiscal resources, and encouraged by 
federalist financial competition, the absence of taxation at source in Switzerland had a direct 
effect on international fiscal rivalry: for non-residents, the Swiss Confederation was actually a 
tax-free zone in the centre of Europe. Table 5 compares the principles of taxation for non-
domiciled individuals in the different countries at the end of the 1930s. It is first necessary to 
draw attention to a general phenomenon: during the interwar years, the relocation of 
patrimony abroad in order to escape taxation was strongly encouraged in most countries in 
two ways. On the one hand, in Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and the United States, 
taxation at source was reduced or set aside on the interest of bank accounts, if those were held 
by non-domiciled holders. Even in Great Britain, contrary to the legislation, the BIR admitted 
that it ‘deliberately turn[ed] the blind eye’ on this kind of incomes.43 The same held true for 
the cashing of foreign share and bond coupons, which were often free of taxes on proving the 
domicile of the owner by, for instance, presenting an affidavit. In a period characterized by 
monetary instability and by the volatility of international capital flight,
44
 the financial powers 
clearly adopted strategies for attracting foreign assets through taxation by not passing the 
increase in fiscal burden on to non-residents. This choice emerged as a necessary condition 
for the development of banking centres due to the degree of fiscal intolerance after World 
War I. On the other hand, the embryonic nature of international cooperation against tax 
evasion and a guarantee of bank secrecy in many countries that were a destination for assets – 
associated with the ineffectiveness of exchange controls
45
 – considerably hindered the 
                                                 
38
 Public Record Office (PRO), IR 85/1, Royal Commission on the Income Tax. Proof of Evidence of 
Hopkins, April 1919. 
39
 The French complementary tax—general income tax— and the British tax—super-tax—applied to 
very few incomes. According to contemporary estimates, French general taxation would reach slightly 
more than one-fifth of national revenue in 1924, and super-tax 27% in 1919-1920 (See Allix and 
Lecerclé 1926, pp. 344-349). 
40
 For the sources on these rates, see Appendix 3. 
41
 On this tax, see Guex (1994). For the rates, see Oechslin (1967, pp. 122-125). 
42
 The gap between legal rates and real taxation should be tested more systematically with the revenue 
of taxes on movable capital, as well as with other countries. For instance, during the whole period, the 
Netherlands seemed to have much lower tax rates than Switzerland: rough average for 0.1M CHF: 
2%; for 1M: 6%; for 5M: 17% (Calculated with Centraal Bureau voor Statistiek 1922-1939b). 
43
 PRO, IR 63/126, Finance Bill 1930, Memoranda, vol. 1, Note from the BIR to Hopkins, Second 
Secretary to the Treasury, and Philip Snowden, Chancellor of the Exchequer, 6 March 1930. 
44
 See James (1992, pp. 596-599; 2002). 
45
 A control of capital export was in force from 1918 to 1928 in France but was inadequate to check 
the capital flight. The same is true for the exchange controls that were implemented in Germany and 
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possibility for the State of the domiciled person to strike at exported capital in fiscal terms. In 
France, according to low estimates, only 30% of all assets invested abroad by private 
individuals would have been reported to the tax authorities in 1937, while the German 
exported capital that was declared in 1925 was totally insignificant.
46
 For these two reasons, 
the chances of double non-taxation — at the place of domicile and at the revenue source—
were increased. 
 Within this general environment, Switzerland was positioned at the forefront of tax 
dumping in presenting, maybe with the Netherlands, the most favourable conditions for 
imported capital. As shown by the examination of the relations with French clients, the 
country extended the offer of tax evasion of its banks. First, not only was no tax levied on 
movable assets taking refuge in Swiss banks, but neither were estate duties collected from 
direct descendants in almost half of the cantons.
47
 The comparative advantage for asset 
management relative to the Anglo-Saxon countries, where inheritance rights could eat into 
half the capital, is evident here.
48
 Even before World War I, the refusal to pay taxes on 
inheritance was one of the main reasons for placing French assets in Swiss coffers.
49
 Next, 
evading foreign taxes on dividends via Swiss banks was made easier by an unconditional tax 
exemption on the cashing of coupons of foreign shares and bonds not quoted on Swiss stock 
markets.
50
 In 1932, the fraud scandal of the Banque commerciale de Bâle, caught red-handed 
by the Paris tax authorities, revealed the volume of this type of traffic; at the time, this bank 
alone handled, with the specific goal of avoiding scheduled taxation, between 1 and 2 billion 
French francs of securities on behalf of French clients.
51
 Lastly, confidentiality regarding 
imported assets was strengthened by the principled opposition of Swiss leaders to exchanging 
fiscal information with foreign countries and by an absolute respect for bank secrecy. The 
absence of administrative assistance left the field wide open to innovative tax-evasion 
activities: at the end of the 1930s, Swiss banks developed, in favour of French taxpayers, 
techniques for circumventing the agreement against tax evasion on estate duties concluded in 
1907 between France and Great Britain.
52
 As for bank secrecy, according to Guex, 
                                                                                                                                                        
Central Europe after the financial crisis of 1931. On the loopholes of these laws, see Germain-Martin 
(1926); Ellis (1941). 
46
 For France, see Piatier (1938, p. 79). Indeed, this figure seems to be very underevaluated. According 
to the information of the French tax authorities, cited by Piatier, the declared capital of individuals that 
was abroad was only 8.2 billion French francs in 1937. (Compare with the estimation of French capital 
flight in note 14). For Germany, see Bundesarchiv (BArch), R2/19814, Report of the Reich Statistical 
Office, transmitted to Herbert Dorn, German Ministry of Finance, 18 April 1930. The declared 
exported fortune was 129M marks, whereas the Reich Statistical Office estimated the total exported 
capital at 5 billion marks. 
47
 See Rikli (1937, p. 245). 
48
 It should be noted that for 1939-40 the capital invested in Great Britain by non-residents affected by 
estate duties was significant: £13,823,281 (See PRO, IR 40/7979, ‘Estate Duty Statistics. Great 
Britain, Year 1939-1940’). 
49
 See Brion (1912); Nordmann (1927, pp. 24-26). 
50
 See Guex (1994, pp. 229-231). Actually, as Guex demonstrates it, almost all foreign securities were 
detaxed (See also Treyer 1939, pp. 83-98). Indeed, the numbers of foreign shares and bonds quoted on 
Swiss markets were low. For instance, at the end of 1938, there were only 34 foreign companies that 
had quoted their shares in the Zürich stock market (See Schweizerischer Bankverein in Zürich 1938). 
51
 See Guex (2007, p. 91). 
52
 See AF, E 2001 D, 1000 1555, vol. 7, Confidential letter from the Federal Political Department’s 
Litigation Bureau to the ASB, 16 December 1938; Notice of Robert Kohli, head of Federal Political 
Department’s  Litigation Bureau, on a phone conversation with Maurice Berthoud, Swiss banker. On 
the other side, British bankers complained to the Treasury of losing French clients in favour of Dutch 
and Swiss banks because of this agreement and tried, without success, to abolish it (See PRO, T 
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Switzerland became in 1934 the developed country where the principle was the most strongly 
protected after its inscription in the banking legislation with the explicit aim of protecting the 
international clientele from the intrusion of foreign tax authorities.
53
 Swiss bank secrecy was 
in fact subject to criminal law, which meant that its violation would be automatically 
prosecuted by the authorities. The Swiss empty tax box was thus very airtight with respect to 
the outside world. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5: Principles of taxation of non-residents at the end of the 1930s  
                                                                                                                                                        
1/11341, Letter from W. R. Malcolm, senior partner at Coutts & Co, to George Murray, Permanent 
Secretary to Treasury, 8 May 1911; T 160/146, Letter from Hopkins, BIR, to George Barstow, 
Controller of Supply Services to the Treasury, 28 July 1922).  
53
 See Guex (2000, p. 244). 
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Sources: see Appendix 5 
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In the interwar years, the Swiss policies of fiscal attractiveness and their link with 
federalism found their most powerful expression in the creation of tax benefits for holding 
companies. Even prior to World War I, some cantons offered tax advantages for such 
companies. After the conflict, taking advantage of the new international financial context, a 
veritable competition to reduce taxes began among Swiss cantons in order to attract foreign 
holding companies.
54
 At the beginning of the 1930s, fourteen of them (that is, more than half) 
had adopted legal provisions that favoured holding companies through a taxation measure that 
applied only to their capital and not to their profits.
55
 As a result, the number of these 
companies increased thirteen-fold between 1921 and 1939, rising from 158 to 2,017. As 
shown in Graph 6 by the lack of connection between capital growth and the creation of 
holding companies during the Great Depression, most companies had in fact very little 
capital, something that decreased their taxation. In 1931, the first year for which we have 
detailed figures, the small companies, with an average capital of around 500,000 CHF, 
accounted for more than 90% of all the holding companies. The main function of these 
letterbox companies managed by Swiss business lawyers and bankers was to use creative 
accounting to reduce the tax burden of not just the multinationals but also of private 
individuals. Through this system, the latter could profit in their own countries from the tax 
reliefs granted to non-residents, by cashing, for example, foreign security coupons on the 
home market via a holding company.
56
 
Like the sweeping tax exemption granted to imported capital, the proliferation of small 
holding companies revealed two features of the Swiss international fiscal policy in the 
interwar period. First, the benefits granted to holding companies showed the capacity of 
financial circles to appropriate Swiss legislation far more than an alliance between fiscal and 
economic interests. For the cantons, the gain in terms of tax revenues generated by the 
creation of holding companies was very marginal.
57
 Second, Switzerland combined the 
advantages of a financial centre of international renown with the practices of small tax 
havens. Its main competitors in the creation of holding companies were not the other great 
European banking centres, which did not use such legal provisions, but Liechtenstein, 
Luxembourg, and Monaco, which embarked on Swiss-style practices. In Liechtenstein, 2,504 
domiciled companies were set up between 1921 and 1945, of which more than 1,000 were in 
fact directly linked to Swiss wealth managers.
58
 In Luxembourg, the 1929 law on holding 
                                                 
54
 On this competition to reduce taxes, see Rosset (1931); Van Orsouw (1995, pp. 39-85). On the 
general development of Swiss holding companies, see Paquier (2001). 
55
 See Rosset (1933, pp. 325-326).  
56
 On the utilization of Swiss holding companies for asset management, by French people, see Centre 
des archives économiques et financières (CAEF), B 43380, Report of the French consul in Geneva to 
Aristide Briand, French Président du Conseil (=prime minister), 5 janvier 192[6] ; by English people, 
see PRO, IR 40/4574, Confidential memorandum prepared for Board’s Committee on Evasion of 
Income Tax and Sur-tax, September 1933. According to this report, the use of foreign holdings and 
trusts was one of the most common ways to avoid the British sur-tax legally. The loss of sur-tax 
revenue was estimated at least at £1,451M by the BIR for 1931/1932. See also Perrenoud et al. (2002, 
p. 47). Note that foundations were also widely used for the same purpose. Their numbers rose in 
Switzerland from 384 in 1919 to 2069 in 1939 (See Bureau fédéral de la statistique 1939, p. 309). 
57
 In the cantons that granted tax privileges, holding companies paid, depending on the canton, 
between 0.04% and 0.15% of tax a year on their capital (Rosset 1933, p. 326). If we take a rough 
average figure of 0.1%, we can then estimate that in the 1930s small holding companies brought in 
around 650,000 CHF revenues from taxes (See Appendix 6). As the totality of cantonal fiscal revenues 
was situated at the time between 250 and 300M CHF, the contribution of small holding companies 
would only be from 0.2% to 0.25% (See Bureau fédéral de la statistique 1940, p. 352). 
58
 See Lussy and Lopez (2005, pp. 96-97). The great majority of these domiciled companies were 
created before the war (Ibid., p. 90). 
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companies, deliberately drawn up in order to compete with the Swiss cantons, also met with 
undeniable success: the number of holding companies was 360 in 1933, then reached 1,110 in 
1938.
59
 By contrast, a court decision in 1928-9 confirmed the right for companies residing 
abroad to be registered in the United Kingdom without paying British taxes in full – a 
decision, according to Picciotto, that ‘created a loophole which in a sense made Britain a tax 
haven’ (Picciotto 1992, p. 8). It does not appear, however, that this provision was widely used 
for tax purposes during the interwar period.
60
 
 
 
6: The increase in holding companies in Switzerland   
1. Number of holding companies in Switzerland. 
2. Nominal capital from holding companies as a whole (in millions of CHF)  
Sources: see Appendix 6. 
 
 
4. Swiss strategies in international negotiations   
 
Alongside the application of internal legislation favourable to foreign capital, the Swiss policy 
of fiscal attractiveness was also vigorously defended in external relations. In order to contain 
the loss of the tax base caused by the flight of capital at the end of World War I, the major 
European States— France and Germany especially—attempted to intensify cooperation 
between the national tax authorities.
61
 At the end of the conflict, bilateral negotiations were 
initiated regarding international assistance against tax evasion, before discussions also turned 
to the multilateral scene at the LON in 1923. These debates were coupled with discussions on 
double taxation, a problem that had greatly affected the multinationals since the war. Due to 
the extension of taxes collected at source, their profits were in effect liable to be taxed several 
                                                 
59
 For the drawing up of the law referring to Swiss practices, see Loi sur les holding companies (1929). 
For the figures, see Delvaux (1938, pp. 7-8).  
60
 There were few registered foreign companies only: around 150 in 1932. Moreover, according to the 
BIR, the British registration of these companies was generally not linked with the tax advantages (See 
PRO, IR 40/4008, Report of Suggett, Chief Inspector at the BIR, ‘1932. Budget – Proposals for New 
Taxation’, 16 April 1932). 
61
 See Farquet (2009a; 2009b; 2010; 2012). 
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times over in the different countries in which these companies conducted their business.
62
 
Hence, the connection established between these two problems provided a bargaining chip for 
the countries requesting tax cooperation: the abolition of double taxation could be strictly 
subject to the simultaneous institution of fiscal information exchanges. Yet, despite this 
advantage, attempts at intensifying fiscal cooperation led to rather meagre results. Attempts to 
reach an overall agreement at the LON quickly foundered in the face of the differences in 
presence between advocates of the fight against tax evasion and representatives of the major 
financial centres. Moreover, while around sixty general bilateral agreements against double 
taxation were signed before World War II, under half of them only contained binding 
provisions regarding tax evasion.
63
 
At first glance, the policy implemented by Swiss leaders with regard to these attempts 
to extend the fight against tax evasion differed only slightly from the line taken by a great 
banking power like Great Britain. Although the latter continued to apply an agreement signed 
in 1907 with France for the exchange of information on inheritance taxation,
64
 English and 
Swiss representatives found themselves together in the camp of opponents to the fight against 
tax evasion at the LON, and neither State signed any convention of fiscal assistance in the 
interwar years. In the two countries, banking circles vetoed participation in international 
collaboration on fiscal matters. Whereas in Switzerland this political line had become dogma 
by 1923, following intense pressure from the influential organization of Swiss bankers, the 
Association suisse des banquiers (ASB),
65
 in the years 1935-1936, the City also managed, in 
extremis, during the negotiations for an agreement with France, to steer the British authorities 
away from international fiscal collaboration.
66
 The ability to keep the English financial power 
away from fiscal cooperation, imitated by its North American counterpart until the very end 
of the 1930s, confirmed the extended capacity of the high-income circles to obstruct taxation 
practices during the interwar years. By contrast with the period after World War II, which 
witnessed the spread of assistance agreements, the avoidance of taxation for non-residents via 
the major banking centres did not circumvent international accords or make use of small tax 
havens; in a way, avoidance was endorsed by the vacuum existing at the level of international 
law. 
 Beyond this general assessment, a very active defence of banking interests 
characterized both internal and external aspects of Switzerland’s fiscal policy. In that sense, it 
differed from British policy in two essential ways. First, from the beginning of multilateral 
talks in 1923, Swiss negotiators presented a more categorical opposition to the fight against 
tax evasion than all the other delegates. Unlike the Swiss experts – but nonetheless without 
                                                 
62
 See Picciotto (1992, pp. 1-37). 
63
 See ALON, F/Fiscal/99, Memorandum by Mitchell B. Carroll, representative of the United States at 
the fiscal committee of the LON, 28 September 1937; Carroll (1939). 
64
 This convention introduced automatic exchange of information on movable capital owned by 
French residents in Great Britain and vice versa. Between 1908 and 1910, 859 cases affecting French 
residents were reported by Great Britain to the French authorities for a total capital sum of £2,752,957. 
In the other direction, 151 cases (£554,426) were reported by France to Great Britain (See PRO, T 
1/11341, Report of the BIR, ‘Anglo-French Agreement of 15th November 1907’). Between 1919 and 
1921, 1,244 cases (£2,668,425) were reported by Great Britain to France and 404 cases (£930,834) 
were transmitted by France to Great Britain (See PRO, IR 62/1161, Note by the BIR on Measures for 
International Co-operation to Prevent Evasion of Taxation, 1922). 
65
 See Archives of the ASB, Minutes of the Committee of the ASB, 19 November 1923; Farquet 
(2009a, pp. 103-108). 
66
 On the pressures of the City, relayed by the Bank of England and the Treasury, see PRO, T 160/956, 
Letter from Kenneth Peppiatt, Chief Cashier of the Bank of England, to Warren Fisher, Permanent 
Secretary to the Treasury, 30 December 1935; IR 40/16898, Report from E. R. Forber, BIR, to Neville 
Chamberlain, Chancellor of the Exchequer, 28 May 1937. 
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accepting the lifting of bank secrecy – the British representatives did not reject the principle 
per se of fiscal information exchanges.
67
 At the beginning of the 1920s, the issue of tax 
evasion was highly sensitive due to the flight of German capital, which deprived the Reich of  
part of the taxes necessary for the payment of war reparations. From a diplomatic point of 
view, it was therefore difficult to oppose international cooperation openly. Nevertheless, in 
Geneva, the Swiss delegates became the voice of international finance against the joint 
advocates of a rapprochement between tax authorities. The Swiss attitude caused quite a stir 
at the LON.
68
 Later on, even if their position was less decisive, the Swiss delegates pursued 
the same policy. To illustrate the extent to which Swiss obstruction was a reality, we may note 
that the Swiss government was the only one to steer clear of scientific cooperation in the 
Geneva organization by avoiding to respond in 1938 to a simply survey on the subject of the 
taxation practices of non-residents. Any ‘publicity’ on this subject was now deemed to be 
‘undesirable’ by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.69 As decisions were taken unanimously at 
the LON, Swiss leaders accordingly hastened the burial of a multilateral solution, the only one 
that could have met the usual objection to the signing of bilateral agreements on tax evasion: 
the flight of assets they would cause in the direction of a third country.
70
 
In the midst of bilateral negotiations on international taxation, the Swiss government 
also developed a more combative strategy than the British one in seeking to obtain tax relief 
for Swiss investments abroad, without however modifying its line regarding tax evasion. 
Unlike Great Britain, which did not sign any overall agreement on double taxation, 
Switzerland put its name to three general treaties against double taxation with important 
economic partners; these treaties contained provisions favourable to its multinational 
industries and to its financial centre. With regard to the banks, the agreement signed in 1927 
with Austria removed taxes on certain loans granted to Austrian clients.
71
 The agreement with 
Germany, signed in 1931 and ratified in 1934, reduced the taxes on the huge number of 
German mortgages in the hands of the Swiss banks and offered certain benefits, though 
ambiguous ones, for the German owners of Swiss holding companies.
72
 Lastly, the treaty with 
France, signed in 1937 and ratified in 1939, was favourable to the direct investments of Swiss 
banks and facilitated their access to French markets.
73
 Put simply, not only did Swiss ruling 
                                                 
67
 For the British position to the LON, see ALON, F. 7, Memorandum of the BRI, annexed to a letter 
from Charles Tufton, Foreign Office, to Eric Drummond, Secretary General of the LON, 3 January 
1923; PRO, IR 40/3419, Report by Percy Thompson, BIR representative to the LON Experts 
Committee on double taxation and fiscal evasion, to Chamberlain, Chancellor of the Exchequer, 30 
October 1923; IR 40/3798, Report by Thompson to Winston Churchill, Chancellor of the Exchequer, 7 
September 1928. 
68
 On Switzerland’s delicate situation at the fiscal committee of the LON, see for example AF, E 2001 
B, 1000/1508, vol. 34, Minutes of the Federal Council, 21 March 1924; Rappard (1925, p. 72). 
69
 AF, E 2001 D, 1000/1554, vol. 27, Confidential letter from Giuseppe Motta, federal councillor in 
charge of the Federal Political Department, to Albert Meyer, federal councillor in charge of the 
Federal Department of Finance and Customs, 2 March 1938. 
70
 The argument for the need of a general agreement, signed by all the financial powers, was 
constantly mobilized at the LON. For example, see League of Nations (1925, p. 26); ALON, 
F/Fiscal/95, Government observations on the proposals of the Committee tending to prevent tax 
evasion to do with income from movable capital, 8 September and 5 October 1937. 
71
 See AF, E 2001 C, 1000/1536, vol. 10, Minutes of the Federal Council, 15 November 1927.  
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 See AF, E 2001 C, 1000/1536, vol. 4, Minutes of the Federal Council, 9 January 1934; Guex (1999, 
pp. 281-286). 
73
 On the implications of Swiss banks, see AF, E 2001 D, 1000/1555, vol. 18, Minutes of the Federal 
Council, 25 June 1937; E 2001 D, 1000/1555, vol. 16, Letter from the Federal Political Department’s 
Litigations Bureau to the ASB, 10 February 1938. On this agreement, also see Perrenoud and Lopez 
(2002, pp. 71-74); Schaufelbuehl (2009, pp. 316-330). 
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circles manage to protect the importing of assets in flight by firmly refusing bilateral and 
multilateral fiscal information exchanges, but the Swiss financial centre also obtained 
substantial advantages on the other side of its turntable business, the (re)exporting of capital. 
Conversely, the international fiscal policy of Great Britain was marked by extreme prudence 
and a very clear wait-and-see policy. Setting aside the limited negotiations about the tax 
surcharge of English industries in France—which did not succeed—the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer put a brake on talks about double taxation in the second half of the 1930s, despite 
repeated complaints from business circles.
74
 In 1938, a member of the BIR summarized this 
position: ‘Our policy in double taxation is festina lente – and Hopkins [of the Treasury] is 
interested as well as the Inland Revenue in ensuring that nothing is done to accelerate the 
pace.’75 
 These differences derived in part from the general orientation of the Swiss and British 
economies in the interwar period. The English refusal of some degree of financial 
liberalization, which signing a double taxation convention with a foreign country would have 
represented, was inscribed within a general falling back of English foreign investments on the 
Empire after World War I, in contrast to Swiss finance, which strove towards expanding in all 
European markets.
76
 These different options in relation to international taxation were also 
strongly influenced by the respective weight and degree of independence of  tax authorities. 
In the same way as for tax reliefs granted to imported capital, the leanness of the Swiss fiscal 
State facilitated the application of strategies based on the unique principle of defending Swiss 
investors. In contrast, the policy of Great Britain was divided between the contradictory 
interests of its tax authorities and its business groups. Actually, in Great Britain, the balance 
of power did not work against the BIR because of the choice made at the end of the war to 
cover the increase in public budgets through much heavier taxation. At the time, the 
development of a fiscal bureaucracy assumed a decisive function for British banks since 
budgetary balance — deemed by banks to be essential to the pound recovering its pre-war 
rate—depended on the efficient collecting of taxes.  
 On behalf of this unnatural alliance, the BIR thus enjoyed great autonomy vis-à-vis the 
City, which intervened directly very little in fiscal matters.
77
 In international taxation 
negotiations, this was also the case. The centre of decision-making was at the BIR—
obviously supervised by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Treasury, and sometimes 
backed up by the Board of Trade. In order to make their voices heard to the British 
authorities, economic circles turned into lobbies by gathering around organizations like the 
Taxation Committee of the Federation of British Industries and the British National 
Committee of the International Chamber of Commerce.
78
 They also took direct advantage of 
the contacts they had within the state apparatus. When it came to brushing aside the measures 
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of assistance against tax evasion, the City benefited from the support of the Treasury, which 
demonstrated intense ideological and sociological collusion with the bankers of London.
79
 
Nevertheless, the bankers were manifestly excluded from the internal decision-making 
process and were not officially informed of the evolution of negotiations.
80
 During a survey 
conducted in 1925 among British bankers as to their opinion of the LON debates on taxation, 
the Swiss ambassador remarked in particular that ‘three of the biggest bankers in London,’ 
had only ‘a vague understanding of what it was all about.’81 
A corollary of the stranglehold the BIR had on the talks was that Great Britain’s 
international fiscal policy was conditioned by a constant concern to preserve tax revenues. 
The taxation at source of the incomes of non-residents as well as the taxation of exported 
British capital provided substantial revenue that the BIR was loath to lose entirely. In 1919, 
the authorities underlined the ‘giving up of considerable amounts’ that the total resolution of 
double taxation would mean.
82
 Moreover, some business groups, active in the home market, 
could also support taxation at source as a way to protect themselves from foreign competition. 
Admittedly, this point of view was not unanimously accepted by the BIR’s top officials: the 
British expert at the LON supported the abandoning of taxation at source, along with limited 
arrangements for exchanges of information, during the 1920s.
83
 Yet, at the beginning of the 
1930s, at a time when the issue of signing fiscal agreements was posed in concrete terms, the 
interest in tax revenues predominated at the BIR and prompted it to arrive at only very limited 
agreements on the reciprocal removal of taxes for commercial agencies and shipping 
companies.
84
 The negotiations on the international tax system constituted, then, neither a 
weapon for the external expansion of British investments nor a means of attracting foreign 
capital. Furthermore, although it refused to enter into confrontation with the City about bank 
secrecy and administrative assistance, the BIR simultaneously engaged in a unilateral fight 
against international tax evasion that was relatively developed for the times. Between 1936 
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and 1938, many legal provisions against fraud were adopted relative to the utilization of 
holding companies in the tax havens, the cashing of British banks coupons abroad or, more 
simply, the transfer of capital outside British territory.
85
 Sheltered from the pressures of the 
financial world by the maintenance of consensus on the most sensitive issues, the English 
administration therefore developed a strategy of international taxation guided by the need to 
preserve the tax base.
86
 
In contrast, the international fiscal policy of Switzerland was characterized by placing 
the state apparatus at the service of the different economic groups. This was expressed by the 
omnipresence of banking and industrial organizations, the ASB and the Union suisse du 
commerce et de l’industrie (USCI, the Swiss Union of Commerce and Industry) in the 
decision-making processes; their experts were always included in the official Swiss 
delegation during interstate negotiations.
87
 As a result, within this liberal corporatism, the role 
of the Swiss administration and government consisted in arbitrating between the points of 
view of these two associations, which could diverge: the industrialists were usually more 
interested in agreements about double taxation than the bankers. In 1935, during negotiations 
with France, such subordination was shown explicitly by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to an 
important Swiss banker: ‘It is fully understood that the Authorities will do nothing without the 
consent, indeed the instigation, of the interested parties’.88 Unlike the situation in Great 
Britain, the influence of the employers on the talks was clearly favoured by the position and 
the structure of the fiscal administration, which did not defend interests of its own regarding 
international taxation. On the subject of double taxation, the desire for reciprocal removal of 
taxes on external investments abroad, expressed by both bankers and industrialists, was not 
opposed  by the Swiss tax authorities or by businessmen active in their home market because 
of the lack of taxes at source. The director of the federal fiscal administration thus became 
one of the strongest advocates of agreements against double taxes.
89
 Issues regarding 
international tax evasion were neglected due to the federal system. The top officials of the 
AFC were not directly involved in the problems regarding tax collection, and they were in a 
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position of institutional weakness. For their part, the cantonal finance ministers, theoretically 
more affected by the loss of the tax base, were sidelined in the decision-making process 
centrered in Bern. Their limited power and fragmentation made them highly responsive to the 
demands expressed by economic groups. For instance, when in 1936 the socialist minister of 
Geneva came out in favour of international collaboration against tax evasion, the banking 
world easily kept him away from the debates.
90
 
 The strike power of business circles in international relations was, therefore, inversely 
proportional to the weakness of the Swiss fiscal State. As no obstacle was placed in the way 
of the employers’ views within the Swiss Confederation, a combative policy was 
implemented towards the outside world in order to obtain tax reliefs on exported Swiss capital 
without establishing in return a system for fighting tax evasion. At the end of the war, the 
Foreign Affairs Division, which significantly occupied a more central place in international 
fiscal issues than the AFC, advocated the unconditional defence of Swiss investors in the 
main disputes about taxation that they encountered abroad, even when they had made use of 
illicit operations.
91
 Within the official talks on double taxation, the adherence of the 
government and the administration to the programme of the ASB and the USCI also 
reinforced the Swiss position. Swiss negotiators were prepared to trade other economic issues 
off against the resolution of double taxation. That was the case with Germany in 1934 when 
the tax agreement was ratified by the Nazis within the framework of a general economic deal 
between the two countries that forced the German Ministry of Finance to give up its demands 
for the enforcement of information exchange regarding tax evasion.
92
 The impact of this 
coordinated strategy was even clearer in the negotiations with France in 1937-1939. For the 
first time, certain industrialists, in opposition to most of the bankers, wanted to make Swiss 
policy on tax evasion more flexible in order to speed up the conclusion of an agreement on 
double taxation. The internal conflict was overcome by granting three huge loans to the 
French State and bribing its negotiators, an operation orchestrated by the ASB and the 
USCI.
93
 In this case, the cohesion between the administration and Swiss business circles was 
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decisive in the final phase of talks; simultaneously, Great Britain was unable to link the 
credits granted by the English banks to France with the signing of a limited agreement on 
double taxation.
94
 Finally, not only was no accurate provision against fraudulent capital 
export introduced in Swiss laws, but the AFC itself made a contribution to the Swiss policy of 
tax evasion by legitimizing it with other States. The subservience of the tax authorities to the 
interests of finance in the 1930s contrasted with the measures taken at the same time by the 
BIR against tax fraud in Great Britain. Within the framework of disputes on the subject of the 
application of the German-Swiss agreement regarding holding companies, the director of the 
AFC used his influence, for example, to remove the taxes on the incomes of Swiss-domiciled 
companies used by Germans in order to reduce their tax burden.
95
 To sum up, while in Great 
Britain the compromise between the views of the BIR and those of the financial world led to a 
gradual distancing from international fiscal negotiations, Switzerland presented a united front 
whereby the various parties joined forces against the demands of Europe’s revenue 
authorities.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
After World War I, the considerable rise in direct tax rates in Europe went hand in hand with 
the preservation of flawed methods for effective collection. What asset holders had to 
relinquish from a legal point of view, they preserved to a large extent in actual practice. 
Capital flight in the face of taxation appeared to be caused not only by the tax burden increase 
within different States, but also by the opportunities for tax removal that arose for exported 
capital. In view of the European allergy to taxation, tax benefits for imported assets, bank 
secrecy, and a lack of international cooperation against tax evasion were actually guaranteed 
on a more or less grand scale by all the major banking centres in order to attract fugitive 
assets. From this perspective, the tax haven boom that occurred during the last forty years of 
the twentieth century reflected a revival of old practices, after the post-war Keynesian 
interlude, much more than any acceleration in a progressive development through the 
century.
96
 
 In this context, as we have seen, the particularity of the Swiss policy in relation to 
other financial powers resulted from the limitation of the state sector after the Great War. This 
situation favoured strategies for attracting capital in two ways. First, the Swiss authorities 
placed no obstacles in the way of tax evasion by abandoning all their tax requirements of 
imported assets. Switzerland thus positioned itself as a front-runner in international fiscal 
dumping. For instance, in 1932, a Bank of England report considered Switzerland as ‘the 
international safe deposit of Europe’. For the Old Lady, the reason for this status was clear: 
‘The facilities offered by the Swiss banks for fiscal evasion have resulted in a steady influx of 
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capital into their country from more nervous countries less fortunate in their governments.’97 
Second, contrary to the British case, the state apparatus readily placed itself at the service of 
the employers in order to take an active part in the preservation of their fiscal advantage in 
regard to other countries. In the debates about international taxation, the director of the AFC 
explicitly praised the ‘fiscal liberality’ of his country.98 Despite the economic orthodoxy that 
prevailed in the administration, it would certainly be hard to find a single British civil servant 
who would have supported such a view. The main lessons of this study for political science 
might thus be that the degree of subservience of the tax administration to business interests is 
a good criterion to distinguish tax havens from other financial centres, even if the latter also 
provide large opportunities for tax evasion. However, there is at the same time a hierarchy 
among tax havens. The Swiss Confederation also differentiated itself from the very small 
offshore centres that were proliferating during the period through its capacity for intervening 
in international relations and organizations. This had a concrete impact on Swiss financial 
attractiveness: banking circles could therefore count on the support of the administration and 
the government to protect the other side of their turntable business in negotiations on double 
taxation.  
 Strengthened once more by the country’s neutral stance, the Swiss international fiscal 
policy held the same line after World War II. While it agreed to certain compromises, such as 
the introduction, during the conflict, of taxation at source of bank accounts,
99
 the Swiss fiscal 
system remained famous for its attractiveness to foreign capital. Internally, fiscal federalism 
enabled the preservation of a low tax burden combined with lax control and collection 
practices.
100
 Externally, the defence of bank secrecy still relied on a principled refusal of 
international exchanges of fiscal information.
101
 In contrast to what happened during the 
Great Depression of the 1930s, cracks have nevertheless appeared in this legal order since the 
financial crisis in 2007. The current pressure against bank secrecy is actually inscribed within 
a movement that is wholly at odds with the interwar years. Whereas that period was 
distinguished by a marked increase in the theoretical taxation of capital, while leaving the 
door wide open to tax evasion through the relocation of assets, a general trend towards 
lessening the fiscal burden on high incomes has been perceptible since the liberalization of 
financial markets.
102
 It would seem as if the international competition to reduce taxes could 
henceforth work without some of the most visible practices of the tax havens. 
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7. Appendices 
 
1. GDP in national currencies (at current prices) in millions  
 
 
Sources: 
- The GDP figures are taken from the compilation made by Smits, Woltjer and Ma (2009). 
- For Germany, the GDP is shown in Smits only in constant prices. The data have been 
‘reflated’ with the consumer price index in Mitchell (2007b, Table H2). 
- For the United Kingdom, Smits shows only the GDP (at factor cost) from Feinstein (1976) 
in constant prices. The data in current prices (at factor cost) have been taken from the latter 
study (Table 3). 
- For the United States, the data are incomplete in Smits. The GDP is taken from Carter et al. 
(2006, vol. 3, Table Ca9-19). 
- For Switzerland, the data are not included in Smits. The GDP is taken from David and 
Ritzmann (2002). 
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2. CHF exchange rates  
 
 
Notes: 
- This means the value in CHF of one hundred units of national currency. (Spot exchange 
rates, bid rates in Brussels, Paris, Berlin, Amsterdam, London and New York). 
- For 1936, the average for the months after the devaluation of the CHF in September has 
been used. 
 
Sources: 
Bureau fédéral de la statistique (1939, p. 211). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Theoretical tax rates on (the income from) movable capital  
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Notes: 
- This means the theoretical rates of direct taxation on wealth and income for a capital of 
100,000 CHF, 1M CHF and 5M CHF for a married man without children.  
- For Switzerland, the rate is the average of the total sum of communal, cantonal, and federal 
taxes in Basle, Geneva, and Zürich, as provided by the AFC in its annual study Les impôts sur 
le produit du travail et du capital. To this has been added the federal tax on coupons on 
shares, which was not always taken into account by the AFC. The theoretical return on capital 
considered was 4% in 1914, 5% in 1919, 6% in 1920-1921, 5% in 1922-1930, and 4% in 
1931-1939. Based on the AFC figures, English and French rates have been calculated for the 
corresponding incomes by utilizing the evolution of exchange rates shown in Appendix 2. For 
1914, the exchange rates of 1913 have been considered. 
- For France, the rate is the total sum of the general tax on income and the scheduled tax on 
income from movable property in shares. The flat deductions for a married man have been 
taken into account, as have the different tax increases for couples without children, as well as 
retroactive increases in the tax rate. 
- For the United Kingdom, this means the cumulative rates of income tax (on 
unearned/invested income) and super-tax/sur-tax. Account has been taken of the deductions 
for a married man, as well as the reduced rates on the lower income brackets. For similar 
calculations close to mine, see Shirras and Rostas (1942, pp. 58-59). 
 
Sources: 
- France: for income tax rates: Piketty (2001, pp. 263-279). For scheduled tax rates: 
Hautcoeur (1994, p. 228). 
- Switzerland: Administration fédérale des contributions (1919-1939). For the federal tax rates 
on coupons, see Oechslin (1967, pp. 122-125). 
- UK: Report of the Commissioners (1914-1940). 
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4. Total tax receipts of the central State and local entities related to GDP 
 
 
Notes: 
- This has been calculated in relation to the GDP shown in Appendix 1. 
- For Belgium, the data are for 1912 instead of 1913.   
 
Sources: 
- The data in compilations like Flora et al. (1983) and Mitchell (2007a and b) are very 
incomplete. I have therefore tried to obtain more complete data with the help of national 
collections of statistics and statistical yearbooks. The results must be considered as work in 
progress. Further research is needed.  
- Belgium: tax revenues have been calculated from Office central de statistique, Annuaire 
statistique de la Belgique et du Congo belge (1918-1944). However, the revenues from taxes 
are not shown for communes of fewer than 40,000 inhabitants. Now, the revenues of the large 
communes represented 52.2% of the overall revenues of communes of more than 5,000 
inhabitants in 1938 (Annuaire 1940, p. 170), which themselves represented 81.41% of the 
overall revenues of communes in 1941 (Annuaire 1943, p. 125). The revenues of the big 
communes have accordingly been multiplied by 1/(0.522x0.8141). In the interwar years, in 
relation to the figures Flora shows for Belgium total taxes in 1925, 1936, and 1938 (1983, p. 
286), the figures correspond on the whole for 1936 and 1938 and are just under 8% higher for 
1925. 
- France: the tax revenues of the central State are shown retrospectively in Institut national de 
statistique, Annuaire statistique de France (1946, pp. 273-274). For the departments and the 
communes, the data shown in the Annuaire (1919-1946) are very incomplete. The figures 
have been taken from Villa (1997, Table Etat TaxG3): 
http://www.cepii.fr/francgraph/bdd/villa/mode.htm 
For 1913, the data for the communes and departments have been estimated based on their 
total revenues (Annuaire 1946, p. 294). As in 1920 their tax revenues (in Villa) amounted to 
16.74% of their total revenues (in the Annuaire), this proportion has been applied to the total 
revenues for 1913.  Even if the tax revenues of the central State in the Annuaire are quite 
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coherent with the few figures shown in Villa (1997, Table Etat TaxG1), the results must be 
considered, however, as approximate only! 
- Germany: Hoffmann (1965, p. 801). Compare with the figures in Statistisches Reichsamt, 
Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich (1920-1940), which differ relatively slightly. 
- Netherlands: tax revenues are to be found in Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, Jaarcijfers 
voor Nederland (1930-1942a). For each year between 1920 and 1939, the yearbook shows the 
total revenue (Jaarcijfers 1930, p. 430; 1932, p. 376; 1941-1942, p. 336). For 1913, the figure 
is an average for the 1910-1914 bracket (Jaarcijfers 1939, pp. 418-419). 
- Switzerland: tax revenues come from Bureau fédéral de la statistique, Annuaire statistique 
de la Suisse (1940, p. 352; 1949, p. 416). The figures for 1913 are not included. The data are 
taken for that year from The Swiss Economic and Social History Online Data Base (Table 
U.10a and U.15):  
http://www.fsw.uzh.ch/hstat/nls/overview.php 
For the communes and the Confédération, this means for 1913 the average of the revenues 
recorded for 1910 and 1915. 
- United Kingdom: tax revenues are taken from Feinstein (1976, Table 14). To those, we have 
added the taxes on capital that appear in Table 34. For these taxes, which represent about 5%-
10% of all revenue, the figures for 1913 and 1939 are nevertheless lacking. For 1939, the total 
of the taxes on capital for 1938 has been used; the figures for these taxes in 1913 have not 
been included. 
- United States: tax revenues are taken from Carter et al. (2006, vol. 5, Table Ea 132-159; 
Table Ea 348-384; Table Ea 489-518). 
 
 
5. Taxation for non-residents   
 
Sources: 
 
- Except for Switzerland, taxation methods on bank interests and foreign bonds are well 
described in a survey of different tax authorities undertaken in 1938 by the LON: ALON, 
F/Fiscal/Evasion 1-42, ‘Réponses au questionnaire du Comité fiscal’, 1938. 
- The respect of bank secrecy by the authorities in taxation practices (not in judicial 
procedures) is broadly specified in the LON study cited above. The contemporary studies on 
this question are very incomplete: Sacker (1933, pp. 122-125); Capitaine (1936, pp. 198-209); 
Sichtermann (1957, pp. 301-329). ‘Automatic information’ means here that the banks had to 
provide information on their clients even without the request of the administration. 
- The rates for estate duties (lowest and highest) and the taxing of securities are those of the 
central states and have been taken from a study supervised by the LON, carried out among 
most of the world’s tax authorities on their taxation practices: Tax Research Foundation 
(1938):  
 - Belgium: the rate on securities is the rate of the tax on income (of foreign origin) 
 from personal property in 1937 (p. 363). The rates on estate duties are those in 1938 
 (p. 365). 
 - France: the rate on securities is the rate of the tax on income from movable 
 capital in 1937 for foreign securities not under abonnement (p. 363). The rates on 
 estate duties are those in 1938 (p. 365). 
 - The Netherlands: the rate on securities is the rate of the coupon tax in 1936 (p.  320). 
 The rates on estate duties are those in 1938 (p. 365). 
 - Sweden: the rates on estate duties are those in 1938 (p. 365). 
 39 
 - UK: the rate on securities is the rate of the income tax (schedule D) in 1937 (p. 363). 
 The rates on estate duties are those of the estate tax, combined with the legacy and 
 succession duties, in 1938 (p. 365). 
 - USA: As Tax Research Foundation (1938, p. 365) does not give the highest rate on 
 estate duties, the rates are those in 1935 (Tax Research Foundation 1935, p. 340). 
- Switzerland is not included nor in the LON report nor in the summary tables of Tax 
Research Foundation (1938, pp. 363-365).  
 - Swiss practices on taxing foreign securities and bank accounts are described in Guex 
 (1994). There were no substantial changes in these tax practices during the interwar 
 years (See Treyer 1939, pp. 57-60; 83-98). 
 - As there is no federal tax on successions, Swiss rates on successions are the cantonal 
 rates for a fortune of 20,000 and 500,000 CHF shown in Rikli (1937, p. 245).  
 - Swiss rates on shares and bonds are those in 1937: Oechslin (1967, pp. 122-125).  
- The number of assistance agreements in 1939 has been calculated on the basis of: ALON, 
F/Fiscal/99, Memorandum by Mitchell B. Carroll, 29 September 1937; ALON, 
F/Fiscal/Evasion 1-42, ‘Réponses au questionnaire du Comité fiscal’, 1938; Piatier (1938); 
Carroll (1939); Henggeler and Rosendorff (1943). Treaties on successions and/or on income 
taxes that provided exchange of information on assets of individuals have been included. 
 
 
6. Holding companies in Switzerland   
 
 
Notes: 
This involves the number of holding companies at the end of the year. From 1931 on, the 
Annuaire statistique separates such companies into three groups: 1) Investment trusts, 2) 
Controlling companies, and 3) Others of the holding kind. It is the third sort which is 
classified here under ‘small’ holding companies.  
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Sources: 
Bureau fédéral de la statistique (1921-1947). 
Compare with the figures shown in Paquier (2001). 
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